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Recent techniques and shifts in the environment are often foreseen as leading management 
accountants to adopt a business orientation. However, empirical evidence pointing to 
fundamental shifts in the roles played by management accountants remains relatively scarce. 
We explore this paradox and give sense to the various roles played by the management 
accounting function by focusing on how management accountants are involved in and 
endowed with authority in decision-making situations. Using data we gathered from 73 
interviews in ten multinational companies, we identify four styles adopted by the management 
accounting function: the discrete, the safeguarding, the partner, and the omnipotent 
management accounting functions. We show that each style can be associated with a specific 
role: discrete control of managerial behaviour, socialisation of managers, facilitation of 
decision-making, and centralisation of power. Some of these roles—facilitating local 
decision-making or discretely controlling managerial behaviour, for instance—have been 
under discussion in the literature for many years now. Our detailed analysis of management 
accountants’ work reveals that these roles can be associated with both unexpected benefits, 
such as fostering creativity, and unforeseen drawbacks, such as drift in governance. 
Furthermore, our findings bring to light other, unexplored roles—centralising power or 
socialising managers, for example—providing us with a more enriched understanding of - 2 - 
management accounting practice. From this in-depth analysis of management accountants’ 
styles and roles we move on to discuss the authority they hold and the 
independence/involvement dilemma they face in the workplace. 
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Introduction 
Management accountants have long played multiple roles variably described as scorekeeping, 
attention-directing, and problem-solving roles (Simon, Kozmetsky, Guetzkow & Tyndall, 
1955). Whereas scorekeeping and attention-directing roles typically focus on compliance 
reporting and control-type issues respectively, the problem-solving role centres on providing 
business unit managers with relevant information for decision making (Hopper, 1980; Sathe, 
1982). These roles respectively match two commonly held images of the typical accountant: 
the bean counter and the business partner (Friedman & Lyne, 2001; Granlund & Lukka, 
1998b; Vaivio, 2006; Vaivio & Kokko, 2006).  
A number of scholars view these two roles as being in conflict (Emsley, 2005; Hopper, 1980; 
Indjejikian & Matejka, 2006; Maas & Matejka, 2009; Sathe, 1978; 1982; 1983). Others 
suggest that the problem-solving role has become more predominant as business unit 
managers face increasingly uncertain environments where new and different information is 
needed to manage uncertainty (Burns & Scapens, 2000; Burns & Yazdifar, 2001; Friedman & 
Lyne, 2001; Granlund & Lukka, 1998b; Vaivio, 2006). Since the late 1980s, the literature has 
examined how these roles have changed (Emsley, 2005; Järvenpää, 2007). Reasons for role 
change are typically linked with business-oriented management accounting innovations, such 
as strategic management accounting, activity-based costing, strategic cost management, life 
cycle costing, competitor accounting, customer profitability analysis, economic value added 
measurement, balanced scorecards, and Japanese target costing (Friedman & Lyne, 1997). 
Business orientation has also been fostered through implementation of modern financial and 
operational control systems and software empowerment (Burns & Scapens, 2000; Colton, 
2001; Granlund & Malmi, 2002; Jablonsky & Keating, 1995; Siegel, Sorensen & 
Richtermeyer, 2003). Lastly, the decentralization of management accountants, who 
increasingly report to their respective business units, is a key element fostering this business - 4 - 
orientation (Granlund & Lukka, 1998b; Järvenpää, 2007). Literature foresees new 
management accounting techniques and changes in organizational and business environments 
having a huge impact on management accountants’ roles, yet empirical evidence on 
fundamental shifts in these roles remains relatively scarce (Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005). 
Most research still empirically discerns the bean counter phenomenon (Vaivio, 2006: 69). For 
example, Järvenpää (2001) reports a broadening of the management accountant’s duties to 
include participative business orientation, but a number of features relating to a bean counter 
profile can still be identified in the study’s interview data. Another survey conducted by 
Malmi et al. (2001: 498) could not gather enough evidence to conclude that “a major shift 
from bean counters to business partners has occurred”. Järvenpää (2007) identifies the 
conditions under which management accountants become business partners, suggesting that 
such a move is neither universal nor easy to implement. We draw two possible explanations 
from these mixed findings: either historical lag explains the gradual diffusion of this new role 
within organizations or we may conclude that not all firms need business partners. We argue 
that comparative analysis is required to understand why management accountants’ roles are, 
or are not, business-oriented and to show what consequences this entails. In this paper, we 
investigate the following question: to what extent might normative claims about business 
partners accurately reflect their roles in practice? Specifically, we give sense to these roles by 
focusing on two points: the authority delegated to the management accounting function and 
the involvement/independence dilemma this entails. 
The findings we draw from our in-depth qualitative research—its limitations 
notwithstanding—compel us to question the model of a single management accountant role. 
Our research is based on twelve case studies in ten firms in which we carried out seventy-
three interviews with both management accountants and operational managers. Double 
triangulation of sources and methods (annual reports, corporate documents, and non-- 5 - 
participating observation) has confirmed the reliability of these findings. In-depth analysis of 
each case and inter-case comparisons provide a layout for our typology of management 
accounting functions in which each style is associated with both organisational benefits and 
risks. Further examination reveals a dominant role for each management accounting function: 
the discrete management accounting function plays a role of discretely controlling managerial 
behaviour; the safeguarding management accounting function plays a role of socialising 
managers; the partner management accounting function plays a role of facilitating decision-
making; and the omnipotent management accounting function plays a role of centralising 
power. This paper raises the question as to how much authority the management accounting 
function should be granted as well as the involvement/independence it should have in relation 
to operational managers. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the roles of the 
management accounting function and investigate both the concept of role and the 
management accounting function as a staff support. We then develop the theoretical 
framework we use to analyse the roles of the management accounting function. In section 3, 
we explain our fieldwork methodology and section 4 presents our typology of roles played by 
the management accounting function. In section 5, we discuss these roles in light of the 
ongoing debate regarding the authority and independence/involvement of management 
accountants. The final part of this paper presents our conclusions and the research 
implications of our analysis.   - 6 - 
1. The Roles of the Management Accounting Function 
 
Roles, benefits and risks of the management accounting function 
Two roles played by the management accountant are commonly highlighted: the role of 
bookkeeper and the role of decision-making facilitator (Emsley, 2005; Hopper, 1980; 
Indjejikian & Matejka, 2006; Sathe, 1978; 1982; 1983). Each of these roles may be associated 
with both benefits and risks (Sathe, 1983). 
The bookkeeper management accountant must “ensure that the financial data of a business 
unit is fair and that internal control practices comply with procedures and the company’s 
policy” (Sathe, 1983: 31). The benefit tied to the bookkeeper is that this role ensures accurate 
information and financial reporting about an entity and its activity (Maas & Matejka, 2009). 
The risk is that the bookkeeper may be seen as an ‘outsider’, thereby making any ‘before the 
fact’ control difficult to achieve (Sathe, 1983).  
The role of aiding decision making makes mid-level operational managers the primary clients 
of management accountants. Here, the accountant’s main task is to provide managers with 
data required for self-control (Hopper, 1980: 402). The benefit associated with this style of 
management accounting function is its contribution to business decision making (Granlund & 
Lukka, 1998b). However, the management accountant’s involvement can also stifle 
operational management initiative and creativity (Sathe, 1983). 
According to Sathe (1983), a firm has no other choice but to count on the local management 
accountant to be an effective local guardian. Yet, management accountants are increasingly 
required to develop a business-oriented role (Järvenpää, 2007; Granlund & Lukka, 1998b). Is 
the role of ‘policeman’ consistent with the role of active participant in the business decision-
making process? Can the accountant effectively wear both hats at the same time, one 
requiring a degree of involvement with affiliated management and the other a degree of - 7 - 
independence from the same? This question has become even harder to answer since 
Mouritsen’s (1996) research found that accounting departments’ work is relational. Building 
on Simon et al.’s (1955) and Hopper’s (1980) theses that issues of involvement–independence 
relate to decentralisation–centralisation, Mouritsen’s findings suggests that organizational 
structure only marginally influences the work of accounting departments. Rather, accounting 
departments’ work should be explained as a relationship between them and other managers in 
the firm (Mouritsen, 1996: 298). It varies according to organizational circumstances but with 
the important caveat that management accountants’ positions are not ‘determined’ by 
themselves. Instead, the work they produce results from the interplay between the aspirations 
and expertise mobilized by accounting departments and the responses to their actions from 
top management and line functions. The work carried out by accounting departments is the 
product of interrelationships between situated managers (Mouritsen, 1996: 285).  
The Concept of Role 
Most research on management accountants’ roles focuses on studying their individual 
characteristics. Surveys of management accountants in both the USA (Siegel & Sorensen, 
1999) and the UK (Burns & Yazdifar, 2001) indicate a broadening of roles and the 
importance of both analytical and social skills in these roles. Coad (1999) argues that 
management accountants can live up to demands for more pro-active involvement and role 
innovation as long as they possess or can develop a learning goal orientation. Byrne and 
Pierce (2007) show that a number of individual characteristics—including business 
knowledge, interpersonal and communication skills, IT skills, technical skills, flexibility, 
personal qualities, monitoring skills and organisational influence—help explain management 
accountant roles (Byrne & Pierce, 2007). Management accountants can exert considerable 
influence over how their own roles are designed and a management accountant’s ability to - 8 - 
shape his role is linked to his individual attitudes, personality and initiative (Byrne & Pierce, 
2007). 
These studies take management accountants as individuals. However, to fully understand an 
individual management accountant’s actions and behaviours and the actual role he plays in a 
given organisation, we should account for his belonging to a group (the management 
accounting function) (Anthony, 1988). To a large extent, the function’s overall positioning 
can explain the role played by management accountants themselves (Järvenpää, 2007). For 
example, Järvenpää (2007), using a case-study approach, examines how corporate culture 
affects and facilitates the management accounting function’s growing business orientation in 
an organisational context, demonstrating that accounting practices are woven into an 
organisation’s cultural fabric and into a broad range of diverse practices that make up its 
business orientation. These findings suggest that management accountants belong to the 
management accounting function and that their individual positioning and role are 
determined, to a large extent, by the positioning of the management accounting function 
within the organisation.  
The concept of role enables us to tie together individual and organisational levels (Katz & 
Kahn, 1966: 171) as often done in both sociological literature (Hughes, 1958) and in the field 
of psychology (Thomas & Biddle, 1966). According to Katz and Kahn (1966), the concept of 
role lies at the heart of any analysis of an organisation, at the crossroads between sociology 
and psychology. Role binds together the macro and micro dimensions inherent in all human 
organisations, being “at once the building block of social systems and the summation of 
individual demands” (Katz & Kahn, 1966: 171)
1.  However, role cannot be observed in a 
                                                 
1 Contrary to Katz and Kahn’s wishes, the great majority of research focusing on role and using concepts defined 
by Katz and Kahn (notably, role conflict and ambiguity of roles) has tended to pertain to the field of psychology, 
quickly dropping the sociological dimension present at the outset (House & Rizzo, 1972; Jackson & Schuler, 
1985). Recent research on management accountants has also taken this route (Maas & Matejka, 2009). Such a 
psychological reading of role conflict is measured on a scale, thereby assuming that roles played by individuals 
within organisations are identified beforehand in a comprehensive manner. - 9 - 
direct way. According to Katz and Kahn (1966: 173), what “is organized are acts—the 
behaviors of people acting on materials, acting on machines, but above all interacting with 
each other”. We understand role by simply observing interactions and activities. 
Understanding the role of a social group, therefore, requires us to study interactions within 
this group and with other groups, as well as studying the activities of members who make up 
the group.  
The Management Accounting Function as Staff Support 
Similar to IT services or logistics, the main purpose of the management accounting function is 
to support staff. For over sixty years, a rich and varied body of literature has focused on the 
role of support staff and examined their centrality (Koontz & O'Donnell, 1974). This research 
stream addresses two overriding issues: the suitable degree of authority to grant such 
functions within the organisation (i.e. the authority dimension: what should their impact on 
decision making be?); and the interests they serve (i.e. the client dimension: whom do they 
serve?). 
The nature of a staff function’s authority is very different from classic authority arising from 
hierarchical relationships because it is by nature functional (Koontz & O'Donnell, 1974). 
Most often, authority is limited to the ability to provide information or advice to operational 
managers. The functional quality inherent in the management accountant’s position precludes 
his holding any sort of hierarchical authority (Bessire, 1995: 43). Although often real, any 
influence he may exert over organisational decision making is indirect and may be tainted 
with ambiguity. Support staff may also play a role of informing upper echelons in the 
hierarchy, resulting in top management decisions to supervise the work of operational 
managers (Etzioni, 1964). A staff function’s degree of authority therefore impacts the room 
for manoeuvre open to operational managers. That said, any authority granted to the 
management accounting function is generally sanctioned by top management, which “can - 10 - 
decide to empower accounting departments to engage in organizational activities, or it may 
decide not to” (Mouritsen, 1996). 
Mintzberg (1983) provides analysis based on the notion of staff function clients. His analysis 
splits staff functions into what he calls the “technostructure” and what he calls support staff. 
The role of the technostructure is to analyse working practices and to standardise procedures, 
results or classifications, thereby serving the purposes of top management. The role played by 
support staff is to provide services to operational managers. Ultimately, the role a staff 
function plays is broadly determined by its main client—whether senior management or 
operational managers
2. Management accounting literature views this issue as a dilemma 
between involvement and independence (Sathe, 1982; Anthony, 1988) and tends to argue that, 
when reporting to operational managers, management accountants have greater involvement 
in local decision-making processes. In contrast, when management accountants report to 
senior management, they have greater independence in relation to operational managers. 
2. Theory Development 
In light of the above, we propose an analytical framework to study management accountants’ 
activity and their function’s positioning. We specify their activity by examining their tasks, 
relationships and image (Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001) and we analyse their position from 
two perspectives. This first is the authority functional managers hold, as manifest in their 
influence over decision making (Etzioni, 1964; Koontz & O'Donnel, 1974); the second is who 
the staff function’s client is, i.e. the individual or group of individuals they are serving 
(Mintzberg, 1983).  
Granlund and Lukka (1998a) assert that environment and organisation structure influence the 
work carried out by management accountants and impact they have on decision-making. 
                                                 
2 However, although the distinction seems clear in theory, ambiguities remain in the very analysis Mintzberg 
provides: the “accounting department” is given as an example of a staff support function, yet “accounting” itself 
falls within the technostructure. The same applies to the management control function.   - 11 - 
Moreover, it has been shown that the role management accounting plays and the position 
management accountants enjoy are culturally grounded at the national (Ahrens & Chapman, 
2000; Granlund & Lukka, 1998a) and organizational level (Burns & Scapens, 2000; Dent, 
1991; Järvenpää, 2007).  
The notion of dominant logic can be useful in understanding the importance of organizational 
culture in shaping the management accounting function (Bouquin, 2001: 115). The basic 
components of a dominant logic are the premises, beliefs and assumptions shared by 
managers at all levels of an organisation (Lampel, 2000). It manifests in two dimensions of 
managerial cognition (Lampel, 2000): information processing and sense-making (Weick, 
1995). By stealth, dominant logic diffuses within the organisation wherein it establishes local 
meaning frameworks to guide strategy implementation, institutes routines (Washington, 
2004), and “interacts with organisational systems and structures” (Bettis, 1995: 8). Dominant 
logic may therefore influence the positioning of the management accounting function. 
Specifically, we may view the work carried out by management accountants as being 
“simultaneously both influenced by and influencing its context formed by its relations to and 
with others in the firm” (Mouritsen, 1996: 299) and the position of management accountants 
as reflecting “forms of interaction between the parties involved in producing, communicating 
and consuming accounting” (Mouritsen, 1996: 300). Likewise, an organisation’s dominant 
logic influences and is partly determined by both the activity of management accountants and 
the positioning of the management accounting function (see Figure 1).  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
Ultimately, by examining dominant logic, management accountants’ activities and their 
function’s positioning, we may better understand the roles the management accounting 
function plays in the organisations we study in this paper. These roles combine positive and - 12 - 
negative effects at organisational level with motives for satisfaction and dissatisfaction at 
individual level.  
3. Methodology 
Research Design 
Like Anthony (1988), we take the management accounting function rather than ‘the 
individual management accountant’ as our unit of analysis. Here, function refers to a 
department or service within an organisation comprising a set of management accountants. 
Simply put, individual management accountants, taken as a group, make up the management 
accounting function.  
The purpose of our research is to describe various roles played by the management accounting 
function. A strategy of using quantitative methods may run the risk of making lesser-valued 
aspects of the management accounting function harder to discern. Hughes (1951a; 1951b; 
1958) has demonstrated that a person’s occupation is a key element of his social identity and 
respondents may well be tempted to project a more flattering self-image than reality warrants 
(Mouritsen, 1996). Provided they are applied with care, qualitative methods are more suitable 
than quantitative methods to enable us to understand the work management accountants carry 
out and to question the view commonly held by consultants in this matter (Vaivio, 2008).  
To understand the roles management accountants play, we set out to combine the variety of 
contexts we have studied, as does Byrne and Pierce (2007), with the depth allowed by case-
study methodology, as developed by Järvenpää (2007). Specifically, we have drawn up 
multiple in-depth case studies, i.e. rich empirical descriptions of particular instances of a 
phenomenon (Yin, 1994). A case-study approach is well suited to theory refinement (Keating, 
1995) and can serve to clarify debate around shifts in management accountant roles. 
Presenting multiple case studies allows for comparison and replication to ascertain whether - 13 - 
emerging findings are consistent in several cases and to broaden the scope of research 
questions (Eisenhardt, 2007). However, case selection should be performed with care. 
Research Sites and Selecting Respondents 
We carried out data gathering in two phases, with an initial exploratory phase of twenty-two 
interviews. Our aim was to build up knowledge of our research object, carrying out interviews 
in different industries purposefully to shed light on both similarities and differences. At this 
stage, one important finding brought out the critical role played by decentralised management 
accountants, thereby contributing to our knowledge of the role of the management function 
overall (Hopper, 1980; Granlund & Lukka, 1998a; Järvenpää, 2007). A nexus of tensions 
between the loyalty they owe to general management and the relationships they must build 
with local management, decentralised operational management accountants embody the 
broader issue of the management accounting function within their respective organisations. In 
contrast, management accountants located in head offices who handle reporting/financial 
issues encountered far fewer conflicts of loyalty than their decentralised operational 
counterparts. To construct a typology, we therefore decided to focus the main thrust of our 
analysis on the tasks, relationships and image of decentralised operational accountants and to 
deduce from our findings any elements enabling us to position the management accounting 
function as a whole on our typological grid. 
With the goal of delving deeper, we conducted a second phase of research with seventy-three 
interviews within the framework of twelve case studies (see Table 1). The findings we present 
in this paper are drawn from this second phase. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
We selected our case studies to cover and compare a relatively large range of industries. 
During case study selection, we eliminated any undesirable variations to ease case 
comparisons (Eisenhardt, 1989). We examined only very large, multinational firms—all firms - 14 - 
in our sample generate more than 60% of their turnovers in export markets and own 
production units outside their home countries. They are mainly industrial mass producers, 
facing uncertain environments and managing product portfolios that include products in both 
growth and maturity lifecycle stages. These listed firms disclose their incomes at least twice a 
year and are widely viewed as successful companies (see Appendix 1). All but three of the 
interviews (with exceptions in Beauty or not Beauty, Luxury) were conducted in France. Nine 
subsidiaries have head offices in France, two have dual head offices in UK/Sweden and 
UK/Netherlands, and one has its head office in Switzerland. All firms in our sample can be 
viewed as performing well, disclosing net profits (at least for 2003 and 2004) and widely seen 
as being among the leaders in their respective markets. 
We did not select cases to be representative of a particular population but to highlight the 
relationships and logic shared by several constructs (Eisenhardt, 2007). We based our 
theoretical sampling on “polar types” with maximum variation between cases (Yin, 1994). 
We sampled extreme cases to bring out contrasting patterns in the data and “to learn about 
one phenomenon while enabling variation of other potentially moderating variables” (Cooper 
& Morgan, 2008: 166). Following this logic, we studied six different industries: cosmetics 
and luxury, personal care, food, auto parts, automobiles and pharmaceuticals. We carried out 
two case studies in each industry, examining further any cases that stood out in light of the 
constructs explored in this study. Whenever interviews in one firm brought to light a very 
different management accounting function from what we had already observed in our sample, 
we continued interviewing there in order to ascertain this logic. In contrast, whenever our 
interviews revealed features similar to those of a management accounting function we had 
previously observed, we stopped data collection. In other words, in each firm we added 
additional informants until we began to hear the same information again and again, indicating 
that we had reached what Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer to as “theoretical saturation”. This - 15 - 
approach helped us to discern clear patterns in the “central constructs, relationships, and logic 
of the focal phenomenon” (Eisenhardt, 2007: 27) and facilitated typology construction. 
We renamed the firms according to several factors, including the firm’s overall image linked 
to its history and its organisational identity, and its industry. For instance, Beauty or not 
Beauty is a worldwide leader in the cosmetics industry distributing its products both in the 
mass market and through select distribution channels. Accordingly, we decided to rename it 
“Beauty or not Beauty”.  
Data Collection 
We used a variety of methods to gather data, including analysis of archive materials (Internet 
sites, internal documents, and annual reports), non-participant observation and interviews.  
Seventy-three extensive interviews were carried out by one of the two authors of this study 
during the period 2002-2005. Notably, due to the sensitive nature of the question, we did not 
ask respondents about the role they thought they played, which would have constituted a basic 
methodological error (Hughes, 1951a). Rather, we chose to interpret roles from detailed and 
systematic analysis of what management accountants described as their daily activities. Our 
concern was to leave them some freedom of speech and to encourage respondents to discuss 
the lesser-valued aspects of their work with confidence. Topics raised during interviewing 
include the following: general features of the organisation, respondent’s background and 
experience, history and structure of the management accounting function, management 
accountants’ daily tasks, the tools they use, the relationships they build with managers and 
their level of job satisfaction. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes and two and a half 
hours, was recorded and then transcribed in full. This generated more than 1,200 pages of 
information in all.  
In one case study, we undertook a triangulation of methods (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) by 
conducting non-participant observation with the goal of ensuring that discourses were - 16 - 
‘consistent’ with actions. For three days from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., we work-shadowed one 
business management accountant and our observations resulted in a 50-page transcript, 
allowing comparison of interview data with what we observed. This nurtured our 
understanding of how relationships between operational managers and management 
accountants in particular are managed, including the bargaining and repeated attempts to 
convince and seduce occurring in the context of a management accounting function we 
categorise as discrete (see below). This approach also allowed us to confirm that our 
interview method was producing a relatively close representation of what was being observed 
directly (notably, in a context in which representations of management accountants were 
hardly flattering).  
We also triangulated sources as interviews were being conducted with management 
accountants and operational managers in one case study. The absence of any variations 
between the discourses of operational managers and those of management accountants 
naturally guided our methodological choices. Rather than continue with systematic 
triangulation, we opted to gather more from interviews with management accountants in a 
variety of environments so as to broaden the scope of our research.  
Finally, we carried out document analysis, gathering annual reports, management accounting 
job descriptions and job vacancies for management accountants to flesh out our research.  
Data Analysis 
Wrzesniewski and Dutton’s (2001) analysis framework approaches an activity by 
differentiating between the tasks, relationships and the perception of work involved. Here, we 
adapt their work to specify management accountant activities.  
We coded our data using a grid drawn from our literature review of the management 
accounting function enriched “in vivo” (Miles & Huberman, 1984). We brought together - 17 - 
information using open coding and then compared management accounting functions in the 
various firms case-studied.  
We used the software NUD*IST Nvivo2 to code all interviews finely according to selected 
categories. This enabled us to draft the detailed analytical framework for management 
accountants’ activity we propose above (see Table 2): 
•  Tasks performed by management accountants are split along four axes: zone of 
competence; tasks tied to measuring performance broadly speaking; internal control; 
and ad hoc analyses.  
•  Relationships developed by management accountants can be divided into two 
subcategories: hierarchical relationships and functional relationships. We also draw 
attention to responsibility sharing with other accountants or operational managers. 
•  Four components of image emerge. The task-based image—similar to what 
Wrzesniewski and Dutton call “the cognitive representation of the task”; the 
relational image—the image a management accountant thinks he projects in 
relationships he builds with counterparts (Friedman & Lyne, 1997; Friedman & Lyne, 
2001); the organisational identity; and the ‘traditional’ image, pertaining to 
stereotypes widely held in society as a whole (Bouquin, 2001).  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Using coding software simplified the transition from individual to comparative analysis. 
Allowing us to gather and compare different codes for a given organisation (for instance, 
tasks or the nature of relationships), this facilitated observation of homogeneity (or 
divergence) in individual discourses within the organisation.  - 18 - 
4. Findings 
A Typology of Management Accounting Functions 
Following the analytical framework presented in Figure 1, we employ four major dimensions 
to differentiate our case studies: the dominant logic, the activity of management accountants, 
the positioning of the management accounting function, and the positive and negative effects 
of structuring the management accounting function at individual and organisational levels. As 
previously stated, we intensively explored case studies that clearly stood out from the others 
in these respects and placed emphasis on extreme cases. From our analysis and comparison of 
various styles of management accounting function, we observed that the role it played 
significantly differed depending on its authority and its client. From our analysis and 
comparison of twelve case studies, we discern four styles of management accounting 
function, each having different practices, benefits, risks and roles: the discrete, the 
safeguarding, the partner, and the omnipotent management accounting functions. Our findings 
were presented to around 120 management accountants on continuous professional training 
courses (executive education) in various teaching institutions. Whether working in 
organisations with a favourable image of the management accountant or not, the large 
majority of these management accountants confirmed and validated our interpretation.  
To facilitate reading, we provide a textual description for each style and clearly annotate 
references to the relevant information in this paper (e.g. see n in Figure 2). 
The Discrete Management Accounting Function 
In the firms Beauty or not Beauty Luxury, Beauty or not Beauty Public, Gastryx, Antalgyx 
and Luxury Lux, we classify the management accounting function as discrete.  
A discrete management accounting function serves local management and its authority 
appears limited. It is associated with a dominant marketing logic and its flexible, barely 
formalised structures enable an organisation to ‘stick closely’ to market trends. These firms - 19 - 
gravitate towards high-potential growth markets such as luxury products, pharmaceuticals and 
advertising. Their success relies on innovation, differentiation, and also promotion. Within 
these organisations, marketing tends to enjoy a major and central position (see n in Figure 2). 
At Beauty or not Beauty, the product manager is seen as an orchestral conductor. The 
one who waves the little baton. You are in charge of your brand or your products, and 
you coordinate an impressive range of services. (Javier, Product Manager, Luxury) 
We product managers are not very involved in financial matters. We are operational and 
strategic managers: where is our brand going? You set the big strategic directions—you, 
the product manager who ‘takes the first step’ and who is then followed by others… or 
not. You may come under some criticism on some points. But you carry on and manage 
your costs. (Emma, Product Manager, Public, Beauty or not Beauty) 
Here, the product manager is portrayed as a mini-CEO handling everything from strategy to 
operations and still managing his costs; respondents have no hesitation acknowledging they 
are “not very involved in financial matters”. Yet, their overall philosophy is to avoid 
delegating too much authority to the management accounting function whose practices could 
inhibit creative staff (see o in Figure 2).  
We were surprised to observe that management accountants in all these firms talked about the 
concept of “business partners” as if it were the Holy Grail. Working in decentralised 
structures and taking on board the discourses of human resources departments, discrete 
management accountants tend to perceive themselves as being at the service of local 
management, strongly associating their organisational identity with the entity to which they 
report. Yet, they encounter one major problem in aspiring to this role model. At best, 
operational managers may not understand the significance of any information or analyses that 
management accountants provide; at worst, they are extremely reluctant to allow management 
accountants to interfere in issues they deem strategic (see p in Figure 2).  
There is a “policing” dimension that we need to fight […]. From the moment I turned up 
with my management accountant hat on in his domain of activity, it was: “I’m 
finishing this off behind closed doors”. I was the cop that was going to cut into his 
budgets, who was going to stop him from working… So, I had to tell him: “Wait, stop. 
You don’t understand. We’re not here to stop you from working. Quite the opposite. We 
are a support function so we must share.” (Vincent, Management Accountant Business 
Unit, Pharma) - 20 - 
Some management accountants opt to focus on the few (and less interesting) tasks that do not 
require participation from operational managers. This further bolsters the supremacy of 
product managers who remain in total command of information and key projects (see q in 
Figure 2). Others try the ‘pedagogical way’ by making product managers aware of financial 
concerns. Unfortunately, many operational managers simply refer them in response to 
marketing assistants who perform ‘non-strategic’ tasks such as managing the order book. If a 
management accountant encourages an operational manager to change work methods or to 
structure them differently, he is seen as “teaching a lesson”. Experienced management 
accountants confide that, after several attempts to change things, they soon learned “to stick to 
their own work”. 
So, I think that our role is less about straying into technical areas, especially when we 
don’t have the competencies. The people we face are doctors and pharmacists; they have 
more knowledge about our products. Our input is the perception of the outsider, the 
layman. “Look, I find this… well, unusual.” But I think we should stay humble in this 
respect and remember that there is more expertise on the operational manager side. 
(Alain, Management Accountant, Subsidiary, Antalgyx) 
Operational managers do not perceive collaboration with management accountants as 
necessary. Consequently, outside of reporting activities, discrete management accountants 
divide their time and energy between raising operational managers’ awareness of financial 
concerns (notably, by developing informal relationships) and their main task of enforcing and 
monitoring compliance with procedures. In addition to reporting, budgetary monitoring is 
confined to signalling overspend. The resulting image of management accountants is strongly 
tainted by this coercive, even ‘bureaucratic’ dimension—a black mark in organisations where 
responsiveness is a watchword. To be accepted, management accountants must remain 
discrete. Unable to fulfil their mission as it is tacitly prescribed (i.e. to be business partners), 
they feel compelled partially to reconstruct their activity (see   in Figure 2). Low visibility 
in the organisation endows them with a degree of autonomy and they create new tasks for 
themselves. Consequently, they develop cost-cutting missions or track failures in internal - 21 - 
control independently of any product manager relationships. Some management accountants 
turn to procuring simple satisfaction from identifying failures—sometimes considerable—in 
internal control to give them a feeling of purpose. Others declared dissatisfaction and some 
even left their jobs to take on operational positions.  
By keeping the management accounting function at arm’s length from operational managers, 
head office ensures that product managers take full responsibility for product success or 
failure and that they are subject to as few constraints and procedures as possible to guarantee 
optimal responsiveness. This management accounting function plays a role of discretely 
controlling managerial behaviour. The main organisational risks stem from internal control 
failures and potential financial waste whereas the main organisational benefits of this function 
include fostering responsibility and risk-taking among operational managers.  
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
To conclude, when the management accounting function is organised as a discrete 
relationship with operational managers, it enables the latter to fulfil their duties in full, to 
remain responsive and be creative. It can, however, also result in drift in internal control and 
some wastage.  
 
The Safeguarding Management Accounting Function  
In the firms Nationauto, Franceauto and Siegeauto, the management accounting function 
plays a safeguarding role. Similar to the discrete management accounting function, the 
safeguarding function holds little authority, but serves head office instead of local managers.  
The characteristics of the markets in which these firms operate do not allow management 
accounting issues to become critical and the “safeguarding” management accounting function 
is concomitant with the supremacy of engineers and sales forces (see n in Figure 3).  - 22 - 
The sales reps are permanently reinventing the future. But they are certainly not the 
ones who make the company’s future. The firm’s future lies with those who design the 
car five years ahead. (Bruno, Director of Management Accounting, Zone, Franceauto)  
The portion of activity that generates the greatest added value in these organisations is 
extremely difficult to model (design, research, development). ‘Cost issues’ should prevail in 
such low-margin industries, but the oligopolistic power of these firms over their 
subcontractors allows them to “outsource cost management/killing duties” (see o in Figure 
3). Another significant aspect of these multinational organisations is how French they appear. 
They follow the model laid down by the French civil service in the way they select and train 
management elites. Most board members are graduates of Polytechnique or ENA, the elite 
school of administration in France, and all employees are encouraged to demonstrate regular 
functional mobility without limitation (as is the case in the French automobile and petroleum 
industries). Every three, four or five years, managers in particular are required to change 
positions and strongly encouraged to switch functions, moving from marketing to human 
resources or production. This creates an organisation marked by status and stereotypes. In the 
French automobile industry, engineers traditionally enjoy a favourable image associated with 
high status (Levy-Leboyer, 1979; Lane, 1995; Porter, 1995). The representation associated 
with sales representatives is also very clear, even though the legitimacy of this industry’s 
sales force is more recent. In contrast, with ill-defined goals and unspecified added value, 
definitions of support functions’ activities and missions suffer from considerable ambiguity. 
This is the case for management accountants, as mentioned in the following extract: their 
stereotypical image remains that of the “French State Treasurer” at the service of head office 
(see p in Figure 3). 
What makes a good treasurer? It’s a guy with a Cristal stamp who uses is sparingly. You 
are endowed with the authority to authorise expenditure and you have what we call a 
Cristal stamp. This is the history of French administration. These stamps incorporate 
your name, your service number, and a copy of your signature. So if you have the stamp, 
you sign. Or you can block. The administration wants, first, there to be no overspend, 
and secondly, for you to have a small margin at hand to pay back if cuts are needed. 
Nobody really cares if the money is well spent or not. (Christian, Project Management 
Accountant, Central, Nationauto) - 23 - 
 
Several factors reinforce the pervasiveness of such stereotypes. The size of the organisations, 
and particularly the highly integrated character of their numerous divisions, makes 
standardising management accounting positions an extremely sensitive issue. The result is a 
blurred definition and representation of the duties and roles management accountants should 
play. Both operational managers and management accountants themselves share similar 
feelings on this point. Safeguarding management accountants’ tasks are fairly typical (see q 
in Figure 3), such as reporting, preparing and monitoring budgets, and mostly respond to the 
normative constraints of the market. Management control tools barely seem to influence core 
operational activities and most tasks are performed at a far remove from operational 
managers. When operational managers perceive a task to be ‘strategic’ they prevent 
management accountants from appropriating it, as is the case for strategic planning at 
Nationauto.  
Here, it was the subject of debate. At Nationauto, the plan is kept by marketing, and 
specifically by the manager of the plan. […] Here, I’m that manager. […] But usually, 
it’s given to people from marketing in the entities.  
The reason why I have the plan is because I haven’t appropriated it. I’m not the one 
who develops the strategy, but I hold their hands until the end. They are the ones who 
carry it out and they are quite happy about that. So I leave them the starring role, 
meaning it is the marketers who present their strategy, but I pull all the strings 
backstage. I monitor them and, if necessary, I discard some ideas but, in the end, it’s 
always their idea and they are the ones who sell it… (Etienne, Financial Controller, 
Division, Nationauto) 
 
Likewise, operational managers are reluctant to disclose information to management 
accountants whom they often perceive as overseers mandated by head office. The knowledge 
management accountants generate seems in effect to serve the purpose of legitimating 
decisions made according to criteria and rationales other than financial logic. A large number 
of management accountants only exert influence when they grant or withhold authorisation 
for expenditure and see themselves pigeonholed as “treasurers of the French administration”. 
Their struggle to take on recognised tasks is relentless, yet the role of the safeguarding - 24 - 
management accountant remains that of censor of last resort relatively disconnected from 
daily operational activity.  
As soon as we talk to [the sales force] about management, they see it as a brake or as a 
sanction on what they can do.  Perhaps at one time, a field sales rep was not even told 
how much what he was selling was bringing in. He wanted to sell, sell, sell. Or 
sometimes, we’d tell him: “Wait, if you sell there… you’ll lose money there. You’ll earn 
money here. So go here.” And they would stubbornly resist. So, we would sit down with 
them in these cases and talk, which was always tough. (Emmanuel, Management 
Accountant, Branch, FranceAuto) 
 
The strict definition of control, synonymous with checks and oversight, takes on its full 
meaning here. The activity of management accountants therefore remains loosely defined and 
conditioned by the nature of relationships they succeed in establishing with operational 
managers, particularly with respect to their network and experience.  
I know a colleague in vehicle engineering who brings in tools to help move operational 
managers forward in the way they manage and it helps us to be more fully accepted by 
operational managers. They get the impression that we are bringing them something 
and that changes everything. Operational managers accept us better and we feel less 
useless. But it’s not always the case. Personally, I went through a period of financial 
controller’s blues. (Etienne, Financial Controller, Division, Nationauto) 
 
At individual level (see   in Figure 3), dissatisfaction felt by management accountants due 
to the glaring lack of recognition and a common feeling of uselessness is put into broader 
perspective by the prospects of functional mobility. “Young” management accountants err on 
the side of seeing their time in management control as a “sometimes tough but highly 
enriching learning experience” and more experienced management accountants capitalise on 
past experience to shape their activity. From an organisational standpoint, functional mobility 
fosters individual satisfaction by offering various career paths where individuals do not feel 
“hemmed in”. Mobility additionally grooms a management elite, high fliers sensitised to the 
complexity of issues and diversity of “professional cultures” that rub shoulders in 








One major drawback of functional mobility is that it hinders recognition of support functions 
in the long run and high staff turnover is a brake on establishing methodologies and training 
teams.  
In short, these firms base their success on internally selecting and training operational 
managers who have in-depth knowledge of the organisation. Sidelining the management 
accounting function may seek to ensure acuity in operational managers’ strategic thinking, but 
it may also lead to sub-optimal financial decisions due to low levels of involvement from 
management accountants.  
 
<Insert Figure 3 about here>  
This safeguarding management accounting function is designed as a staging post on the career 
path of future managing directors, raising their awareness of the financial dimensions of 
decisions they will make in future. The major organisational benefit is that it fosters 
operational managers’ creativity and ensures that financial concerns do not have a 
stranglehold over strategic thinking. The main risks include weakening support functions like 
management accounting and impacting the decision-making process. 
The Partner Management Accounting Function 
 
The partner management accounting function  serves local management and holds a high 
degree of authority. Partner management accounting functions emerge when the need for 
operational managers to consider financial questions holds a strategic dimension (see n in 
Figure 4). When overwhelmed by operational issues, managers delegate to management 
accountants any analysis they deem necessary to decision-making (see o in Figure 4). - 26 - 
We have our say because, today, profitability targets are extremely high for Agape. We have 
our say, are heard and listened to. That said, we mustn’t have any illusions. It is a company 
with a marketing and sales character. It’s an industrial group that manufactures marketed 
products. (M. Anvers, Management Control Manager, Agape France, Ice Creams) 
Here, the dominant logic is marketing, and financial and other conditions must also be met. 
Operational activity must be understandable and therefore easy to model using control tools, 
and operational managers must accept to share knowledge of their activity with management 
accountants and to inform them about their projects and ongoing activity (see p in Figure 4). 
Management accountants are therefore involved in tasks to produce information not only for 
local management but also for head office and for financial disclosure. The organisations in 
which they work are structured in divisions or as matrices and reporting is one way for the 
firm to allocate resources and to measure performance (see q in Figure 4). Nonetheless, the 
main client is local management.  




and  all  financial  aspects  go  through  us.  (Charlotte,  Management  Accountant, 
Business Team Household Care, Mondomarket) 
The information partner management accountants purvey is, broadly speaking, subordinate to 
the quality of the relationships they succeed in establishing and maintaining with operational 
managers. Indeed, even when certain conditions are met whereby management accountants 
can be seen as equals, personal ambitions and strategic challenges recall the fragility of their 
status.  
If you are just a controller - I take the figures, I look and, if things aren’t good, I say so - 
you will never inspire the trust of the operational managers. They will always see you as 
a controller and you will never really manage to understand the reality and the drivers of 
the business.  
In fact, my first choice is never to break the link with the operational manager. 
Otherwise, it means I have to change jobs, or at least positions, because either he has to 
go or I have to change positions. (M. Namur, Operational Management Accountant, 
Zone, Agape Beverages) 
Nonetheless, the authority partner management accountants hold allows them to see this 
relationship as free from all feelings of subordination and based on willing participation, - 27 - 
which they can fully control (see   in Figure 4). They perceive themselves as co-pilots, 
gaining satisfaction from “piloting together, on an equal footing” and taking an active part in 
strategic decision making. From a cognitive viewpoint, management accountants are pleased 
“to be at the heart of the action”, a privilege above all privileges for a support function that, 





Conversely, the closeness of decentralised management accountants to local management can 
result in complete “absorption” of the former into the latter. In such cases, management 
accountants devote most of their time to operational issues and regret not being able to spend 
more time, nor having the opportunity, to focus on larger financial issues such as taxation or 
financial engineering. Moreover, they receive a large number of requests from their functional 
reporting line for analyses and information, which they often deem redundant with regard to 
what they already provide to operational managers or of no interest in dealing with local 
emergencies.  
Ties established between operational management and the management accounting function 
are sources of organisational benefit insofar as the organisation faces cost pressures and, 
simultaneously, sets out to be bold and responsive in its differentiation strategy. However, 
these firms are increasingly subject to pressure to produce short-term results and, courtesy of 
their strong ties with operational managers, management accountants may allow themselves 
to become partners in managing competing and contradictory demands for short-term results 
from financial markets and for economically and strategically necessary risk-taking going 
forward in the long term.  
Some situations are really ambiguous. For instance, you stash away some cash, which 
is something we do very, very often in management control, and you find  yourself 








stash  away  cash.  (M.  Namur,  Operational  Management  Accountant,  Zone,  Agape 
Beverages) 
 
<Insert Figure 4 about here>  
 
In conclusion, when the management accounting function is organised to work in partnership 
with operational managers, it encourages them to account for the financial dimension in 
operational decision-making. However, organising the function in this way can lead to 
inhibiting operational managers, fostering drift in governance and income manipulation. The 
main risks lie in internal loss of control and the notable outcome that managers may game the 
budget and manage their earnings. 
The Omnipotent Management Accounting Function 
We observed the omnipotent management accounting function at work in an auto-parts 
manufacturer, Equipauto. The emergence of an omnipotent management accounting function 
goes hand in hand with major emphasis on controlling costs across the entire organisation (see 
n in Figure 5).  
For me, it’s about opting for efficiency. In the automobile equipment manufacturing 
sector where economic competition is so intense, putting either marketing or 
engineering first, which will make better products that won’t sell, is simply not possible. 
So, we live in a world where it is not simply a question of cutting costs but of crushing 
them and in which, if we fall asleep at the wheel, we are dead, game over… If we don’t 
manage the financials, the company cannot survive. If we want to survive in this 
environment, we have to have the means. So we put the attainment of financial targets 
first, and then with the budget [allocated] we develop [products]… (Bernard, Branch 
Management Accountant, Equipauto) 
The emergence of this function also correlates with the appointment of a financial manager as 
Equipauto’s Chief Executive Officer. The goal of top management’s policy was “to put 
power back into its own hands”—sole guarantee of the firm’s survival and future success. - 29 - 
Here, the dominant logic is short-term financial logic driven by the activity of management 
accountants. Developing the authority of the control function is one of the instruments of this 
power (see o Figure 5), but it is conditioned by implementation of other organisational 
devices too, particularly by splitting the structure into independent and competing profit 
centres. 
Equipauto is a group organised into eleven branches, ten industrial branches. […] Each 
of the branches is then organised into divisions. At Equipauto, the autonomous entity is 
the division and the division is a SME that includes all departments. So, the boss of this 
SME has his R&D, his industrialisation, his finance, his trade, his purchasing—all the 
departments typically found in a company. He is accountable for everything. The division 
is the most important entity at Equipauto. (Bernard, Branch Management Accountant, 
Equipauto) 
 
A particularly powerful network of management accountants has developed. They are 
selected and trained by “senior controllers” and career prospects appear unlimited since the 
CEO himself once held this position. Even when reporting to operational managers, 
management accountants show flawless loyalty to senior accounting management (see p 
Figure 5).  
The financial controller at Equipauto is relatively well known. It’s a bit like a State 
within a State at Equipauto. There is a very strong functional network, independent 
from the reporting line. Personally, I report hierarchically to my site director, who is a 
“producer”, and I report functionally to my branch financial controller. You should 
know that I owe my “first loyalty” to my functional area. And if I have a problem or a 
fight between my two “directors”, paradoxically it is the functional director who will 
win the day. And this is true at all levels of the company. (Olivier, Financial Controller 
Site, Equipauto) 
Reporting and budgeting are instruments central to global organisational control, so 
management accountants continually focus significant amounts of time and attention on these 
tasks (see q Figure 5). One specific feature of the omnipotent management accounting 
function is the imperative nature of its recommendations. The positions seem to be inverted 
here: having to account for their actions continuously, operational managers become 
providers of figures and statistics on which management accountants base their managerial 
decisions. Investment requests—symbolic tests of engineers’ power—become moments of - 30 - 








This episode perfectly illustrates the nature of relationships between management accountants 
and operational managers. Coyly veiled under the term “co-pilot”, omnipotence fools nobody 
within these organisations: in reality, management accountants are perceived as corporate 
cops. Yet, despite pressures weighing heavily on their shoulders, they seem particularly 
satisfied (see   Figure 5) and soon gain access to important responsibilities and actively 
participate in decision-making. They do not count their working hours and view any sacrifices 
they make in their private lives as trade-offs for better career prospects, both inside and 
outside the organisation.  
One undeniable organisational benefit is that the organisation is under tension, relentlessly 
looking to cut costs. However, major drawbacks are associated with the omnipotence of the 
management accounting function. Financial short sightedness can take hold of top 
management and an obsession with measurement can distract operational managers from 
other undetected problems. Since each decision must be systematically argued from a 
financial viewpoint, operational managers find themselves inhibited.  
At Equipauto, the risk is that, because we are very powerful, we can abuse this power 







(Olivier, Financial Controller, Site, Equipauto) - 31 - 
Although this conception may suit routine control of activity, it is ultimately much more 
complex to manage in a context of innovation.  
 
<Insert Figure 5 about here>  
 
The omnipotent management accounting function enjoys uncontested and incontestable 
authority placed at the service of head office. Under Harold Geneen’s leadership (Sampson, 
1973), ITT provides an historical example of an organisation fairly close to the Equipauto 
model. In both cases, the goal of the director introducing a new organisational structure was 
to ‘break down the feudal ties’ within the organisation and to put the power back into the 
hands of the centre—i.e. ‘to divide and rule’. The omnipotent management accounting 
function’s main role is to centralise power in the hands of head office. The organisational 
benefit linked to this type of management accounting function is to ensure that financials are 
at the heart of decision-making. Significant risks entailed include inhibiting operational 
managers, short sightedness (focusing exclusively on the short-term), and obstacles to 
innovation.  
5. Discussion 
The above analysis brings us to propose an empirically based typology of management 
accounting functions and to examine management accountants’ authority and 
involvement/independence in relation to operational managers.  
Roles of the Management Accounting Function 
As stated above, research on the management accountant’s roles tends to analyse individual 
characteristics (Coad, 1999; Byrne & Pierce, 2007). Studying individual characteristics 
reveals what management accountants are able to do, their actual capacities and abilities. Our 
findings suggest that management accountants within a given organisation seem to face the 
same issues and similar difficulties. Although individual singularities emerge from each - 32 - 
respondent’s answers depending on training, personal experience and personality, the overall 
positioning of the management accounting function broadly determines the individual 
experiences of management accountants. From our systematic empirical analysis, we can 
confirm that, to capture the role management accountants ‘actually’ play within organisations, 
researchers should not only focus on the individual characteristics of management 
accountants but also account for the environment in which they work (Järvenpää, 2007).  
By comparing case studies, we are able to show in this paper that activities are necessarily 
constrained and can be partly explained by the dominant logic. We argue that acquiring in-
depth understanding of management accountants’ activities and environments is a prerequisite 
to grasping the roles played by management accountants in organisations.  
Four styles of management accounting function emerge from our case-study analysis: the 
discrete, the safeguarding, the partner, and the omnipotent management accounting functions. 
Two dimensions help differentiate between these four styles: authority—the extent of 
management accountants’ influence over decision making; and the client—the individual or 
group of individuals the function serves (see Figure 6). 
<Insert Figure 6 about here>  
 
For each style, the management accounting function is associated with specific benefits, risks 
and organisational roles. In light of these benefits and risks, we can draw out four dominant 
roles in four types of management accounting function (see Table 3). Some roles— 
facilitating local decision-making or discretely controlling managerial behaviour, for 
instance—are closely related to roles previously identified in the literature. Here, we identify 
other, unexpected roles—centralising power or socialising managers, for example—to enrich 
this view of management accountants.   
<Insert Table 3 about here>  
 - 33 - 
Similar to many researchers, Sathe (1982) deems one type of management accounting 
function to “perform more highly” than the others. He calls it the “strong controller”, 
whereas professional literature prefers the term “business partner”. Our research shows that 
some organisations cannot—or perhaps even should not—endow themselves with an 
omnipotent or partner management accounting function. Each style of management 
accounting function entails both benefits and risks at individual and organisational levels.  
We should note that many of our sample firms adopt a discrete style and that very few follow 
an omnipotent style. This finding is consistent with Mouritsen’s (1996) conclusions that very 
few accounting departments (about 5%) hold powerful positions in relation to production and 
sales/marketing functions. None of the styles suggested by Sathe (1978; 1982; 1983) matches 
our discrete style. This may reflect specific cultural values—a certain “French touch” in the 
French subsidiaries of multinational firms we studied—but it remains noteworthy that high-
performing and sustainable firms in our sample choose this type of positioning for the 
management accounting function. 
Authority of the Management Accounting Function 
Our research suggests that in organisations where the management accounting function holds 
little authority, management accountants confine their activity to certain technical tasks. Yet 
in organisations where the management accounting function enjoys significant authority, i.e. 
the omnipotent and partner functions, we show that management accountants are still not 
exempt from technical tasks. Rather, they tend to cumulate and alternate between the roles of 
overseer and advisor, as suggested by Granlund and Lukka (1998b). This also confirms 
Mouritsen’s finding that accounting departments’ “core tasks” relate to ‘bookkeeping’ work. 
All remaining accounting department competencies are negotiable, since other actors may 
impose ideas for control to substitute the dominant theories in accounting departments 
(Mouritsen, 1996: 300). When fully empowered, accounting departments can take part in - 34 - 
management activities or serve management teams and influence the firm’s businesses by 
developing “consulting work”.  
Furthermore, we show that organisations granting considerable authority to the management 
accounting function thereby ensure that financial issues weigh in systematically and 
powerfully on operational decision-making. Yet it would be wrongheaded to imagine that the 
only way to make certain that financials are accounted for in decision-making is by creating a 
powerful financial function. Nationauto, Franceauto, Beauty or not Beauty and LuxuryLux 
are far from being ‘out of control’ and rigorously account for the financial dimension in their 
operational decision making. Our findings confirm and illustrate Mouritsen’s (1996) intuition 
about competition for consulting activities. In our case-study firms, top management chose 
not to empower management accountants to engage in organizational activities, instead 
leaving sales, marketing, and production staff to organize information flows, management 
reporting and internal consulting for themselves. To give an example, product managers are 
systematically obliged to integrate financial issues into their thinking about products as soon 
as they join Beauty or not Beauty. They may ‘think with an income statement in their minds’, 
but they also know that it is not ‘cost effective’, with either time or savings, to track costs 
constantly. Others examples include engineers at Nationauto and Franceauto who integrate 
economic reasoning into their decision making, notably in vehicle development stages, 
regardless of the fact that the management accounting function holds little authority in these 
firms. A function holding limited authority can therefore still be compatible with emphasis on 
the financial dimension in decision-making.  
By delegating only limited authority to management accounting functions, these firms 
implicitly, or explicitly, argue that they are seeking to foster creativity and accountability 
among operational managers. At the same time, they accept a certain level of organisational 
and financial slack. Controversially, our analysis suggests that the management accounting - 35 - 
function may actually make managers more irresponsible by inducing them to forget basics: 
innovating and risk taking (Bouquin, 1998; Moriceau & Villette, 2001). Given the enduring 
success—or longevity, at least—of the firms deploying such arguments and analyses, such 
considerations may not be as counterintuitive as they first appear and may even suit certain 
business contexts.  
The Independence-Involvement Dilemma 
Our analysis raises the issue of the independence of the management accounting function in 
relation to operational managers, notably in the context of the “partner” function. According 
to Sathe (1982), a strong controller manages to reconcile both his control and advisory 
responsibilities, yet our research suggests that reconciling the two is actually rather difficult to 
achieve. We can confirm Granlund and Lukka’s (1998a) findings about how difficult it is for 
an individual to act out both business-oriented and local-guardian roles. One management 
accountant provides an illustration to show how this independence-involvement conundrum is 
solved in practice. Operational sales managers come to ask a management accountant if they 
can use their advertising budgets not to promote the product in the eyes of the final customer, 
but to ease commercial relationships with intermediaries, offering them discounts. This results 
in the management accountant becoming involved in accounting manipulation, since he will 
help using some resources for other reasons than the ones they were aimed to in the budget. In 
reaching his decision, the management accountant makes an involvement/independence call. 
He could simply refuse, thereby displaying his independence and implicit loyalty to head 
office, but he would face the subsequent risk of operational managers simply concealing 
information in the future and seeing him as a “bureaucrat bookkeeper with no understanding 
of market constraints and reality”. Alternately, he could agree, going as far as helping 
operational managers to hide any manipulation. The management accountant chooses to 
position himself in the eyes of operational managers “as a true business advisor, a full - 36 - 
member of the team, whom they can trust”. Drawn from a French context, our example shows 
that a business-oriented management accountant’s ability to criticize managerial plans and 
operations is limited—an observation that moderates Granlund and Lukka’s (1998a) findings 
relating to Finnish controllers.  
Our research confirms that building team relationships requires both physical proximity and 
psychological affinity (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005). Reciprocal trust appears to be both a 
prerequisite to a business orientation and a consequence of it. Management accountants often 
take the first step in this fragile relationship by demonstrating to operational managers that 
they can share information in confidence. In such contexts, we observe that business-oriented 
management accountants may hesitate to take the “ethical/independent” path—akin to 
betraying their operational partners. Indeed, decisions on an almost daily basis serve as many 
testimonies to the roles management accountants choose to play.  
We can view the independence-involvement issue from the perspective of information 
asymmetry. The management accountant’s independence appears to be a balancing act on the 
tipping point between ideal independence and real dependence, a realistic trade-off negotiated 
between operational manager and management accountant (Richard, 2006). Contrary to Sathe 
(1982), our findings suggest that splitting teams provides no guarantee of improving the 
reliability of information reported to head office. Although it may promote management 
accountant independence to a certain extent, informational asymmetry between operational 
managers and management accountants specialising in reporting may distort the quality of the 
information the latter provide. Inversely, to strengthen their ties with operational managers, 
management accountants may even partake in gaming their budgets and managing their 
earnings (Lambert & Sponem, 2005).  
The independence dilemma proves all the more difficult to solve because our results confirm 
Mouritsen’s (1996), Burns and Baldvinsdottir’s (2005) and Byrne and Pierce’s (2007) - 37 - 
intuitions that greater involvement from management accountants requires management 
backing. We show that operational managers and management accountants must both agree 
on changes in the latter’s role for any changes to become reality. In both the discrete and 
safeguarding styles, management accountants aspire to become business partners assisting 
operational managers in decision making. However, they face operational managers who hold 
different views and feel that interacting with management accountants means either wasting 
their time or jeopardising their freedom.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper’s contributions are threefold. First, we develop an empirically based typology of 
the management accounting functions, drawing on twelve case studies and seventy-three 
interviews. We identify four styles of management accounting functions: the discrete, the 
safeguarding, the partner, and the omnipotent management accounting functions. We show 
that these styles are closely linked to the dominant logic in each organisation and our findings 
bring to light a variety of roles tied to the management accounting function. Some of these 
roles—facilitating local decision making or discretely controlling managerial behaviour—
have been previously identified in the literature. Detailed analysis of the work carried out by 
management accountants shows that these traditional roles can lead to both unexpected 
benefits (e.g. fostering creativity) and unforeseen drawbacks (e.g. drift in governance). It also 
reveals several unexpected roles—centralising power or socialising managers—and offers a 
more enriched understanding of management accounting practice. Our research confirms that 
the ‘myth’ of the management accountant business partner—who is close to and heeded by 
operational managers—is not as commonplace as we may be led to believe (Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005). 
Second, our results allow us to examine and provide additional insight into the authority held 
by the management accounting function and the issue of relationships with operational - 38 - 
managers (Mouritsen, 1996). The majority of management accounting functions we study in 
this paper enjoy only limited authority. Moreover, when management accountants hold 
considerably more authority, the organisation focuses decision making on financial issues. 
However, we also show that it is possible to integrate economic reasoning into operational 
decision making without delegating significant authority to management accountants. Some 
firms, for instance, opt to develop operational manager accountability through socialisation. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that delegating too much authority to the management 
accounting function increases the risk of operational managers forgetting basics, thereby 
putting a brake on innovation and fostering risk aversion.  
Additionally, our findings touch upon the independence-involvement issue and confirm that 
combining these two dimensions is rather hard to do (Granlund & Lukka, 1998a). We take 
this a step further by arguing that satisfying conflicting demands should be viewed as a 
specific dilemma facing management accountants. Reciprocal trust and close personal ties 
appear to be sine qua none conditions for reducing informational asymmetry between 
management accountants and operational managers. In daily interaction with operational 
managers, management accountants are compelled to put their guardian responsibilities on 
hold and to partake in gaming budgets and managing earnings to ensure strong relationships 
with operational managers. Our findings show that the dilemma facing the partner 
management accounting function is particularly delicate. Either it can choose to impose its 
authority, thereby inhibiting the creativity of operational managers mostly concerned with 
their bottom lines, or it can be co-opted by operational teams and employed to manipulate 
income (Lambert & Sponem, 2005). 
The primary limitation of this study stems from the cultural specificity of the cases we study. 
Even though we selected multinational organisations, most of our data was collected in 
French subsidiaries. Management accounting tools tend to homogenise practices (Granlund & - 39 - 
Lukka, 1998) and yet, from one country to another, management accountants still develop 
different professional identities and practices (Ahrens & Chapman, 1999; 2000). The second 
limitation relates to the type of organisations we focus on—large, industrial, multinational 
firms. We would perhaps draw different findings from SME and/or service-sector case 
studies, and from collecting data in other countries. The third limitation pertains to the data 
collection method. Our stated intention was to balance our research’s depth (by using multiple 
interviews and documentary sources in each case study) and width (by studying twelve 
different cases). We halted data collection in each case study when we felt we had reached 
theoretical saturation and then checked the relevance of our findings with organisational 
members. Although the internal validity of our findings may be high, they suffer from 
inherent difficulties in externally validating any qualitative study. Generalising our findings to 
alternate contexts and organisations requires more exploration.  
The findings suggest several paths for further research. It would be interesting to develop a 
longitudinal analysis of the cases we study to observe potential changes in the roles of 
management accounting functions over time (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, Järvenpää, 
2007). Moreover, our findings compel us to question the contemporary fascination with the 
business partner (Byrne and Pierce, 2007). The image of a proactive accountant involved in 
all decision making casts a long shadow over representations in the minds of management 
accountants, operational managers and business students alike. It tends to make the first feel 
guilty, the second threatened, and the third all too often disappointed by their subsequent 
experiences in this domain
3. One fruitful avenue of research could involve investigating the 
ways in which management accountants cope with conflicting representations of their roles.  
 
                                                 
3 This paper is the fruit of similar personal experiences. Both authors have been hired for several management 
accounting internships during which neither had the feeling of playing the role of a “business partner”. - 40 - 
 
Figure 1 – Analytical Framework of Roles of the Management Accounting Function 
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Table 1 - Summary of Interviews Conducted in the Case Studies  
 
Business  Firm 1  # of 




Beauty or not Beauty 
Luxury 
6 MA 
2 OM  LuxuryLux 5  MA 
Personal Care  Mondomarket 




Food  Mondomarket 
Delicatessen  8 MA  Agape  3 MA 
Auto Parts  Equipauto  9 MA  Siegeauto  5 MA 
Car Makers   Nationauto  9 MA  Franceauto  7 MA 
Pharmaceuticals  Antalgyx  6 MA  Gastryx  4 MA 
Total   46    27 - 42 - 
Table 2 - Dimensions and Features of the Management Accountant’s Activity 
Activity of Management Accountants 
Tasks 
Zones of competencies: accounting, information systems, cash flow analysis 
Measuring performance 
-  External reporting to head office 
-  Budgeting process and variance analysis  
-  Strategic planning 
Internal control, procedures 
Ad hoc analyses, transversal projects  
Relationships 
Hierarchical relationships 
- Frequency and quality of relationships 
Functional relationships 
- Frequency and quality of relationships 
Sharing responsibility with other management accountants or with operational managers  
Self Image 
Task-based image: added value, assistance in decision making 
Relational image: from spy to partner 
Organisational identity: attachment to products, to the organisation 
Traditional image: bean counter, overseer, cop 
 
 




Figure 2 - The Discrete Management Accounting Function 
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Figure 6 - Styles of Management Control Functions 
 
Mondomarket, Agaape 
Equipauto  Nationauto,  
Franceauto, Siègeauto
Beauty or not Beauty, Luxury 










Weak Strong - 48 - 
Table 3 - Summary of Different Styles 
  
 Discrete  Safeguard  Partner  Omnipotent 
Authority Weak  Weak Strong  Strong 
Client Local  HQ  Local  HQ 
Benefits 
Managers taking 
responsibility for the set of 
issues tied to their scope of 
action; creativity and 
responsiveness fostered 
































                                                 
4 Due to our focus on decentralised operational management accountants, we cannot make any clear statements 
about help provided by management accounting functions in allocating resources at group level. Interviews 
carried out with the central management controllers (notably, during the exploratory phase) suggest that when 
the authority of the management accounting function is high, the function plays a role in allocating resources. - 49 - 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1- Presentation of Case-study Firms  
 
Firm Sector





Antalagyx Chemicals  Pharmaceuticals  -  60  000 
Gastryx Chemicals  Pharmaceuticals  80  69  000 
Equipauto  Vehicles and 
Equipment 
Auto parts 
Manufacturer  67 70  000 
Siegeauto  Vehicles and 
Equipment 
Auto parts 
Manufacturer  65.5 60  000 
Franceauto  Vehicles and 
Equipment  Carmaker -  200  000 
Nationauto  Vehicles and 
Equipment  Carmaker 65  132  000 
LuxuryLux  Luxury 
and Cosmetics  Diverse (Luxury)  85  56 000 















Personal Care And 
Diverse Food  80 265  000 
Agape Agrifood  Diverse  Food  -  230  000 
 
 
                                                 
5 Labels correspond to French classifications of professional activities (NAF) issued by the INSEE in June 2004 
(www.insee.fr). 